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This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Housing
Project in the Republic of Korea, for which Loan 3329-KO in the amount of US$100 million
equivalent was approved on July 19, 1991, and made effective on October 16, 1991.
The loan closing date is June 30, 1995 but the loan was fully disbursed as
of December, 1993.
The ICR was prepared by Jed David Kolko (consultant) of the Urban
Development Division in the Environmentally Sustainable Development Vice Presidency and
reviewed by Mr. Vineet Nayyar, Chief, EAlIN and Mr. Mohammad Farhandi, Acting
Projects Advisor, Country Department I, East Asia and Pacific Region.
Preparation of this ICR was begun during the Bank's final supervision
mission in November, 1994. It is based on material in the project file. The borrower
contributed to preparation of the ICR by performing statistical analysis, commenting on the








i. This project was designed to introduce regulatory reform into the Korean housing
sector. Few Bank projects anywhere have focused so directly on regulatory reform, and this
project took an innovative approach to designing and monitoring a reform program.
ii. As in many countries, the Bank's strategy for housing in Korea shifted away from
physical, site-specific, public-sector-focused projects toward policy-reform projects that
enabled the private sector to function more efficiently. In most places, an "enabling"
strategy meant reforming or redesigning the roles of public agencies, strengthening their
commitment to assisting poorer households, and introducing new pricing policies or financial
instruments. This project embodies such an enabling strategy. (paragraphs 1-7.)
Project Objectives
iii. The project objectives were to support the Government's objectives in the sector by
providing additional resources for the National Housing Fund's (NHF) lending for lower
income housing and by assisting the Government in formulating a framework for housing
policy development and an agenda for policy reform in the sector. The Government's broad
objectives for program and policy reform are reported as being: (i) to better target public
housing assistance to the poor in terms of the needs of the recipients and to minimize the cost
of providing the assistance, and (ii) to improve regulation of the sector in order to increase
the efficiency with which the market provides housing services to the entire population.
iv. To meet these objectives, the project included two components. The first, the
investment component, provided support for an ongoing program of targeted lending through
the National Housing Fund (NHF), the government's account window for low-income
borrowers. NHF is overseen by both the government's Ministry of Construction (MOC) and
the public Korea Housing Bank (KHB). NHF loans are long-term mortgages on residential
properties for targeted beneficiaries.
v. The second component involved developing a program of policy and regulatory
reform and a capacity for implementing that program and monitoring the results. The
government proposed a strategy, developed with the Bank, for the policy and regulatory
review. This strategy, the Policy Development Statement (PDS) consisted of four areas to
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study: (i) government housing programs; (ii) housing sector regulations; (iii) the land supply
system; and (iv) other housing-related policies, such as capital gains taxation. Out of these
studies would emerge the major areas needing reform, and, ultimately, the government's
reform agenda.
vi. Progress in carrying out sector reform would be monitored using five key sector
performance indicators: (i) the ratio of average house price to average household income;
(ii) the ratio of average rents to average household income; (iii) the ratio of the price of
residentially zoned land to the price of adjacent raw land; (iv) the ratio of the market price
of housing to the factor cost of housing; and (v) the rate of progress in assisting target
households in the bottom half of the income distribution. These indicators would be
collected regularly by the Ministry of Construction and might also be used to reveal
additional aspects of the housing system in need of reform. They would replace the physical
indicators that the government had traditionally used to describe the housing market, such as
new housing units constructed and the ratio of households to housing stock.
vii. The Korean government planned to fund the studies entirely itself. Thus, the total
Bank loan was $100 million, the amount lent under the investment component. (See
paragraphs 8-16.)
Implementation Experience and Results
viii. The objectives were achieved. The investment component was implemented as
planned, with the loan disbursed even more rapidly than projected. Under the policy
development component, studies were completed, policy dialogue conducted, and reforms
promulgated. The precise steps, though, diverged in some ways from the process envisioned
in the project design.
ix. The studies, described by the government and Bank in the PDS, were modified
during project implementation by MOC, with Bank agreement, and though somewhat
different in substance, were still wholly in line with the project's development objectives.
MOC was slow in initiating these studies, but they were completed. These studies did reveal
the inequity and inefficiency of many housing programs and regulations and led to proposals
for and actual reform. Indicators have been collected, but their use in policy development is
not fully institutionalized in MOC. But these indicators have taken on an unexpected
political importance: in discussions on housing policy, "indicators" have become an
established part of political rhetoric.
x. Major housing and land reforms have taken place in Korea during the project
period. First, the new government (1993) elevated regulatory reform in all sectors to
primary importance and assigned this work to a Public Administration Innovation Committee
which relied to some extent on the concepts and people involved in this project's studies.
Second, the land-use law was changed in late 1993, raising the fraction of developable land
from 16% to 41% of total supply, and decentralizing the zoning and permitting processes
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thus addressing one of the fundamental issues identified at project identification. Third, the
government began allowing and encouraging private provision of infrastructure, thus
facilitating the development of raw land further expanding the supply of serviced land.
Fourth, in 1994, as part of the reform of government housing programs studied under the
project, the government began phasing out its deeply subsidized "permanent rental" housing
units, on which the interest rate charged was often negative. This change removed an
inefficient and poorly targeted subsidy. (See paragraphs 17-29.) The studies raised many of
the housing issues acted upon by the government during the project period and the results
and experience gained by the study team were important inputs to the reform process.
xi. It is highly likely that this project's achievements will endure. The changes that
have taken place already are permanent. Many of the specific regulatory reforms already
undertaken are difficult or impossible to reverse and are therefore very likely to be sustained.
In the strict financial sense, sustainability has been achieved because the on-lent funds are
being repaid and the proceeds are available for other uses. (See paragraphs 30-32.)
xii. Both the Bank and the borrower performed well. The project design was
straightforward and the details well outlined in the project documents and the Policy
Development Statement. The Bank was careful to insure that its own strategy was consistent
with the government's and to involve the government in designing the project. The
government took responsibility for funding and structuring the technical assistance elements.
Overall, the government demonstrated its commitment to regulatory reform, the fundamental
objective of the project. Housing regulations have been under scrutiny at the highest level of
government, and regulatory reform has become high profile. (See paragraphs 33-38.)
xiii. This project is rated satisfactory. (See paragraph 39.)
Summary of Findings, Future Operation, and Key Lessons Learned
xiv. Two main lessons emerge from this project's experience. First is the
unpredictability of the process of policy-making. This project attempted to increase the
technical capacity for policy-making but still found the initiative and timing for reform driven
by political mandates.
xv. Second is that projects emphasizing policy and regulatory reform cannot be
evaluated in the same way that investment projects can. One of the clearest signs of this
project's impact-the adoption of indicators in the political rhetoric-is nearly unquantifiable,
short of performing content analysis of political speeches. And one traditional method of






A. STATEMENT AND EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES
1. This project was designed to introduce regulatory reform into the Korean housing
sector. Few Bank projects anywhere have focused so directly on regulatory reform, and this
project took an innovative approach to designing and monitoring a reform program. Two
conditions made this sector ripe for this unusual kind of project: the structure of the Korean
housing and land markets, and the relationship between Korea and the Bank.
The structure of the Korean housing and land markets
2. Korea's economic development in recent decades has been impressive by any
standard. GNP growth has averaged 8% between 1960 and 1989. Even more remarkable
was Korea's 12% growth rate in the late 1980's, just before the project was designed. With
this rapid growth came urbanization. The proportion of Koreans living in cities grew from
38% in 1960 to 73% in 1989. This urban population boom resulted in high urban residential
densities and significant pressure on the urban housing and land markets.
3. Housing and other policies in Korea intensified housing demand above even the
level attributable to macroeconomic and demographic factors. Very low effective real estate
gains taxes and property taxes made real estate an attractive investment. Financial sector
controls on interest rates inadvertently made real estate investment even more attractive.
Furthermore, price controls on new units stimulated demand by implicitly offering a subsidy
to buyers equal to the difference between the controlled price and the market value of units.
4. On the supply side, several policies reduced the responsiveness of supply. Primary
among these was the rigid land supply system, under which conversion of land zoning to use
for residential purposes was difficult and minimal compared to demand. An example was the
establishment of green belts around major cities, which made a ring of land on the city's
outskirts unavailable for development and resulted in higher prices and densities within the
city. This restriction on supply was aggravated by the near-monopoly the public sector had
on developing large tracts of land, which prevented the private sector from supplying
developable land in response to increasing demand. Price controls, mentioned above, also
reduced supply responsiveness by lowering the profitability of producing housing.
5. These inappropriate policy responses to rapid growth and urbanization resulted in a
badly distorted housing market. Rapidly increasing housing demand resulted not in rapidly
increasing output but rather in rising prices. Housing prices rose faster than general
inflation-in real terms, house prices grew almost 6% per year from 1974 to 1989. In urban
areas, the fraction of households owning their homes fell from 50% in 1970 to 40% in 1989.
2A good measure of distortion is the ratio of average house price to average household
income, which is higher when housing supply is less responsive to demand. This ratio was
9.3 in Seoul, compared to 4.1 in Bangkok, 5.0 in Kuala Lumpur, 7.4 in Hong Kong, and 2.8
in Singapore, according to the UN Habitat-World Bank Housing Indicators Program.
The relationship between Korea and the Bank
6. This project was the fifth in the housing sector. With the sector and the
government in general, the Bank developed a mature relationship, and this project was one of
the last Bank loans to Korea. Previous projects focused on low-cost housing methods, the
land development agency, and the housing finance system. As in many countries, the Bank's
strategy for housing in Korea shifted away from physical, site-specific, public-sector-focused
projects and toward policy-reform projects that enabled the private sector to function more
efficiently. In most places, an "enabling" strategy meant reforming or redesigning the roles
of public agencies, strengthening their commitment to poorer households, and introducing
new pricing policies or financial instruments.
7. Another element of the Bank's mature relationship with Korea is the Korean
government's desire to fund its own studies and technical assistance rather than relying on
Bank financing, as other countries often do. There are several reasons for this. First, Korea
is in better financial position than most countries and therefore need not rely as heavily on
Bank financing. Second, the technical staff in and available to the Korean government is
highly trained and generally extremely competent. Korea, therefore, has a great capacity to
carry out its own studies with less technical advice from the Bank. Third, the Koreans
prefer to use Bank technical assistance as training for its own staff, and by funding studies
themselves can guarantee that the training benefits are conferred on their own staff.
The project's objectives
8. The Bank sought to design a project that would tackle the regulatory barriers to a
more efficient housing market and, at the same time, augment Korea's significant technical
capacity.
9. The SAR listed the project's objectives as supporting the Government's objectives
in the sector by providing additional resources for the NHF's lending for lower income
housing and by assisting the Government in formulating a framework for housing policy
development and an agenda for policy reform in the sector. The Government's broad
objectives for program and policy reform are reported as being: (i) to better target public
housing assistance to the poor in terms of the needs of the recipients and to minimize the cost
of providing the assistance, and (ii) to improve regulation of the sector in order to increase
the efficiency with which the market provides housing services to the entire population.
10. To meet these objectives, the project included two components. The first, the
investment component, provided support for an ongoing program of targeting lending through
the National Housing Fund (NHF), the government's account window for low-income
3borrowers. NHF is overseen by both the government's Ministry of Construction (MOC) and
the public Korea Housing Bank (KHB). NHF would on-lend the loan proceeds for housing
construction; these development loans would be converted into mortgages for targeted
beneficiaries. The Bank would offer $100 million in financing, which was estimated to fund
15,000 housing units. Bank involvement would represent a small fraction of NHF's expected
business during the project period (1991-1995), estimated to be $15 billion.
11. The second component involved developing a program of policy and regulatory
reform and a capacity for implementing that program and monitoring the results. The
Ministry of Construction would perform or contract out several studies to evaluate the impact
of several kinds of government intervention in land and housing markets. The government
proposed a strategy, developed with the Bank, for the policy and regulatory review. This
strategy, the Policy Development Statement (PDS) consisted of four areas to study: (i)
government housing programs; (ii) housing sector regulations; (iii) the land supply system;
and (iv) other housing-related policies, such as taxation of housing. Out of these studies
would emerge the major areas needing reform, and, ultimately, the government's reform
agenda.
12. Progress in carrying out sector reform would be monitored using five key sector
performance indicators: (i) the ratio of average house price to average household income;
(ii) the ratio of average rents to average household income; (iii) the ratio of the price of
residentially zoned land to the price of adjacent raw land; (iv) the ratio of the market price of
housing to the factor cost of housing; and (v) the rate of progress in assisting target
households in the bottom half of the income distribution. These indicators would be
collected regularly by the Ministry of Construction and might also be used to reveal
additional aspects of the housing system needing reform. They would replace the physical
indicators that the government had traditionally used to describe the housing market, such as
new housing units constructed and the ratio of households to housing stock.
13. The Korean government planned to fund the studies entirely itself. Thus, the total
Bank loan was $100 million, the amount lent under the investment component.
Evaluation of objectives
14. The objectives and components of the project were realistic and low-risk. The
investment component was designed to finance a portion of NHF loans rather than trying to
set up new administrative or institutional channels for a different lending structure. The
policy development component was also low-risk because it was developed in collaboration
with the government during preparation and had significant support by the time of Board
presentation as evidenced by the official letter of commitment to the PDS. Government
commitment to the technical aspects of the project is further evidenced by the fact that the
Bank loan represented an insignificant 0.6% of NHF's expected income during the project
period, pointing to the government's interest in the continued involvement of the Bank in the
housing sector for technical reasons unrelated to resource transfer.
415. The objectives were also innovative. Regulatory reform is a more complicated and
difficult basis for a project than either physical construction or the creation or elimination of
sector agencies. Success is therefore more troublesome to measure than in more concrete
projects. Still, the project design did incorporate yardsticks for gauging overall
improvements in the sector.
16. In a sense, the project proposed a strengthening of the policy-making process for
Korea. By assigning to MOC the tasks of overseeing policy studies and collecting indicators,
out of which policy reform might be developed, the project introduced a policy-development
process that was innovative for Korea. Typically, policy is driven almost solely by political
mandates, as in most countries, and the various government ministries respond to reforms
initiated at the top of government. This project, though, called for technical work within a
ministry to steer policy reforms or, at least, to provide the substantive argument for or
against specific reforms.
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
17. The objectives were achieved. The investment component was implemented as
planned, with the loan disbursed even more rapidly than projected. The remainder of this
section will therefore elaborate on the policy development component. Under the policy
development component, studies were completed, important policy dialogue begun, and some
reforms promulgated. The precise steps, though, diverged somewhat from the process
envisioned in project design.
18. The studies described by the government and Bank in the PDS were modified, with
Bank agreement, and though somewhat different in substance, were still wholly in line with
the project's development objectives. The first two studies, those on government housing
programs and on housing sector regulations, were combined in order to take advantage of a
common methodology which applied cost-benefit analysis both to programs and regulations;
the third, on land supply regulation, was replaced with the analysis of a housing demand
survey for the formal purposes of this project but, in fact, another study by KRIHS during
the project period did address the agreed land issues and ultimately provided input to the
important reforms in this area of housing-related policy. The fourth study, on other policies
affecting housing, primarily taxation, was excluded from the project because government
responsibility for such matters was not easily assembled under MOC to direct this study.
However, a researcher involved in the identification of the studies for this project and then
employed at the research institution affiliated with the Ministry of Home Affairs (called the
Local Government Research Institute) took the lead on local property and transaction taxation
of land and housing and produced a study during this period which was an input to the
reform process. The studies directly associated with this project and related analytical work
were discussed with Bank supervision missions through an organized association of housing
and land policy specialists in Korea.
19. The studies of housing programs and regulation, and housing demand survey were
contracted out to the Korea Research Institute on Human Settlements (KRIHS), a research
5agency owned by MOC but independently managed. A project ambition to create capacity
within Korea as close to the policy-makers as possible was achieved by contracting the
studies to an organization with a good working relationship with the relevant ministry.
Though MOC was slow in initiating these studies, they were completed in a fashion
consistent with the development objectives of the project. These studies did reveal the
inequity and inefficiency of many housing programs and regulations and led to proposals for
reform.
20. The collection and tracking of sectoral performance indicators was also contracted
out to KRIHS. Indicators were collected for the introductory portion of the housing program
and regulation study and have been collected for all years of the project period (see Table 5).
Their use, however, has not yet been institutionalized at MOC as envisaged at the outset.
Nevertheless, these indicators have taken on an unexpected political importance: in
discussions of housing policy, "indicators" have become an established part of political
rhetoric. The government cites these data as evidence of the need for further reform and has
made the public aware of their meaning and importance.
21. Though some of the originally proposed studies were not completed under the
formal arrangements for this project, the issues identified and both the results and skills
acquired by Korean analysts associated with this project are closely linked to the major
housing and land reforms which have taken place in Korea. First, the new government
(1993) elevated regulatory reform in all sectors to primary importance and assigned this work
to a Public Administration Innovation Committee (PAIC). Second, the land-use law was
changed in late 1993, raising the fraction of developable land from 16% to 41 % of total
supply, and decentralizing the zoning and permitting processes. Third, the government
began allowing and encouraging private provision of infrastructure, thus facilitating the
development of raw land. Fourth, in 1994 the government began phasing out its deeply
subsidized "permanent rental" housing units, on which the interest rate charged was often
negative. This change removed an inefficient and poorly targeted subsidy. The studies
raised many of the housing policy and regulatory issues acted upon by the government during
the project period and the results and experience gained by the study team were formal inputs
to the reform process. The primary linkage between project studies and reforms is perhaps
the staffing of the technical committee on housing for the PAIC by the researchers working
on the studies under this project.
22. The data collected on the indicators provide a quantitative view of the performance
of the housing sector during the project period. The recent numbers are drawn from studies
or exercises undertaken in conjunction with this project while earlier references use other
sources. In addition to the specific trends noted, the use of indicator type data reflect a
different view of how to measure housing sector performance. House prices (for Seoul)
climbed rapidly from 1988 to 1991 falling back nearly 30% by 1994 while income rose
steadily through the period. The result is a dramatic reversal of the price-to-income ratio
from over 9 to less than 5 in the past four years in contrast to previous times in Korea where
income and the price-to-income ratio were both rising. The indicator on the relative level of
rents shows the opposite trend, where over a nine year period, the rent-to-income ratio has
6almost doubled to .29 in Seoul though stabilizing in other major cities at .20. For the ratio
of residentially zoned to adjacent raw land in the sample of three cities reported, there is no
clear trend with the ratio varying among cities from 3.3 to 5.4. Falling housing prices,
along with stable building and land costs, meant that the ratio of market value of new houses
to factor cost has narrowed from 2.2 to 1.1. And the fraction of NHF borrowers in the
bottom half of the income distribution has stayed rather constant during the project in the
48%-58% range, up from around 30% in the mid-to-late-1980's.
C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT
Factors beyond government control
23. Korea's economic growth slowed in 1992 to 5%-while most countries would envy
this rate of growth, it represented a decline from the 9-10% rates that characterized the
period. With this general slowdown came a nearly unprecedented flattening and, in some
cases, a decline in house prices. Also, housing construction in "new towns" contributed
enough to the housing stock to halt rising prices. These new conditions in the housing
market reduced the political pressure for immediate reform and the timetable for setting up
and contracting out the studies accordingly slipped.
24. The economic slowdown and rapid construction, in a simplistic sense, appeared to
achieve what regulatory reform was designed to achieve: a reduction or reversal in the rise
of housing prices. But these changes, in themselves, did nothing to change the structural
problems with the Korean housing market. The economic slowdown and rapid construction
were, in the terminology of economics, an outward shift of the supply curve, which resulted
in a one-time reduction in house prices.
25. But the policy and regulatory barriers that made housing supply unresponsive to
changes in demand remained. These barriers constitute an inelastic supply curve where
changes in demand would still result more in changes in prices rather than in changes in
output. Removing these barriers would mean a rotation of the supply curve, rather than a
parallel shift. Those in government who understood this - that a temporary macroeconomic
and production-driven respite from rising housing prices was no substitute for fundamental,
longer-term reform - argued successfully for the studies under this project. MOC
contracted the studies out to KRIHS in December 1992, a year later than planned, and they
were completed largely on time in 1994.
Factors subject to government control
26. In 1993, after Korea's presidential election, the government decided to elevate
regulatory reform in all sectors to primary importance, and assigned the Public
Administration Innovation Committee the role of reviewing regulations and proposing
alternatives. This new focus on regulatory reform was inspired more by the worldwide trend
of "reinventing government" and "cutting red tape," rather than by the distortions in any one
sector, housing or otherwise.
727. The effect of this emphasis on regulatory reform was to bring to public light
precisely those issues in the housing sector that this project was examining. Several
important reforms (listed in paragraph 21) took place quickly, far faster than the expected
timetable which envisaged waiting for completion of the studies, MOC review of the results,
and then recommendations. Some critical regulatory reform, therefore, was achieved long
before the time envisioned under the project (though even these reforms were, in part,
derived from MOC and KRIHS work related to the Bank project). The experience of this
project also clarified the relationship between the project strategy of creating technical policy
development capacity, and the timing of reforms driven by the political process. The former
can not determine when reforms will be acted upon but it can alter the content and quality of
the reforms themselves.
Factors subject to implementing agency (MOC) control
28. MOC experienced considerable personnel turnover during 1991 and 1992. The
MOC staff involved in designing the project with the Bank were not the same people as those
involved in implementing the project. This turnover had two effects on the project: (i) there
was a one year delay in contracting out the studies to KRIHS; and (ii) there was resistance at
MOC to assuming the regular collection of sectoral performance indicators, since the agency
lacked the continuity in staff - and was unable to increase its staff complement - to
guarantee their continued collection.
29. As a result, the studies were delayed, and KRIHS was responsible not only for the
regulatory studies, but also for the collection of indicators. Assigning the collection of
indicators to KRIHS made sense because only KRIHS, not MOC, had staff with the technical
training to perform economic research and analysis. KRIHS has collected indicators data for
all years of this project but the use of this information has not yet been institutionalized in
MOC.
D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY
30. It is highly likely that this project's achievements will endure. The effects of
regulatory reform have already become institutionalized. Sectoral performance indicators
have entered into the political rhetoric, and one-the house price to income ratio-has been
designated by the government as the measure of the impact of housing policy. While it is
difficult to measure the extent of this change on political rhetoric, the changes that have
taken place already are permanent.
31. Also, many of the specific regulatory reforms already undertaken are difficult or
impossible to reverse and therefore will very likely be sustained. For instance, the change in
the land-use law that allows a much higher fraction of land to be developed cannot easily be
reversed after the newly-developable land is built upon.
832. The investment component benefits are financially sustainable because the on-lent
funds are being repaid and the proceeds are available for other uses.
E. BANK PERFORMANCE
33. The Bank's performance, by and large, was good. The project design was
straightforward and the details well outlined in the project documents and the Policy
Development Statement. The Bank was careful to insure that its own strategy was consistent
with the government's and to work closely with the government in designing the project.
The Bank also deserves credit for setting out clear monitoring indicators for sector
performance-these indicators provide a way to track improvements in the sector and also
represent a permanent contribution of the Bank to the policy dialogue in Korea.
34. The policy development component might have begun on time if the Bank had a
greater understanding of different government agencies' roles. The project made MOC
responsible for data collection and analysis, but these tasks were outside MOC's mandate and
were beyond its technical capacity. One result is that indicators collection has not yet been
institutionalized, and these indicators are therefore not being used as fully as they might have
been.
F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE
35. The Government of Korea's performance was good, especially considering the
unusual nature of this project. The government worked well with the Bank in designing the
project, and, as is typical for projects in Korea, took responsibility for funding and
structuring the technical assistance elements.
36. There were some delays in implementation: MOC contracted the studies out to
KRIHS a year late, and the project audits were consistently submitted late to the Bank.
More important than the delays were the substantive and process changes MOC made to the
studies. Though the Bank and the government originally agreed to specific topics to be
studied under the technical assistance, some parts were changed, and a couple were not
completed within the formal structure of the project - again, with the Bank's approval.
Also the collection of indicators was not institutionalized in MOC. These divergences from
the project design were due, in part, to turnover at MOC and the difficulty in establishing
continuity of staff working on the project.
37. Delays in providing audits represented a breach of the loan covenant and was the
area in which the government was out of compliance throughout much of the implementation
period. Audit delays are common to all projects in Korea, regardless of the particular
ministry, so the late audits were not a problem unique to this project. Nonetheless, audits
are an essential element of Bank project supervision, and their prompt submission is a
requirement written clearly into every loan agreement.
938. Overall, the government demonstrated its commitment to regulatory reform, the
fundamental objective of the project. Although the content and process of implementing the
studies designed to bring about reform were altered, the government far exceeded the
project's goals. Housing regulations have been under scrutiny at the highest level of
government, and regulatory reform has become high profile. Reforms have been
implemented that should increase the supply of developable land and make government
housing programs more efficient. And the government has successfully changed the way that
the country thinks about housing: rather than measuring the impact of housing policy in
terms of government units produced, the government now reports indicators-like the ratio of
house prices to income-that reflect the efficiency of the housing market as a whole. In this,
the government's performance is most commendable.
G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME
39. This project is rated satisfactory. It achieved its major objectives and has had a
discernible, sustainable positive impact on Korea's housing sector.
H. FUTURE OPERATION
40. This project is the last in the Korean housing sector as Korea will no longer be a
borrower from the Bank. Still, there is potential for additional work on Korea.
41. An immediate need is help institutionalize the use of analytical work such as the
indicators inside government. The Bank and the government agree that these indicators are a
valuable tool for tracking progress in the housing sector. More generally, the Bank plans to
continue its relationship with KRIHS directly. Also, the Bank has participated in housing
conferences in Korea and will continue to make available technical advice and lessons from
experience in other countries.
1. KEY LESSONS LEARNED
42. Two main lessons emerge from the project. First is that the process of policy
reform is much more unpredictable than envisaged in the carefully scheduled program of
studies designed for this project. The limits of technical policy development capacity are that
the timing and institutional process for policy reform will always be politically driven. The
initiative for the impressive regulatory reforms that took place came from political mandates
- like the Public Administrative Innovation Committee - with the study results and
analytical capacity created under this project largely affecting the content of the reforms. In
theory, the substantive goal of the project, regulatory reform, might have been sparked by
technical work or by political mandates. In the end, it was initiated largely by political
events which should be taken into account in setting the objectives for future policy
development projects.
43. The second related lesson is that projects emphasizing policy and regulatory reform
cannot be evaluated in the same way that investment projects can. One of the clearest signs
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of this project's impact-the adoption of indicators in the political rhetoric-is nearly
unquantifiable, short of performing content analysis of political speeches. And one
traditional method of judging a project's impact-the economic rate of return-is somewhat
misleading in this context. This is because ERR for housing projects is typically calculated
by comparing the market value of completed housing (or the discounted rental income
stream) to the market value (or shadow prices) of housing inputs. Typically, the higher this
ratio, the greater the ERR, and the greater the economic impact of the project. Here,
though, this very ratio is one of the sectoral performance indicators, and in this context it is
desirable for this ratio to decline over time. The lower this ratio is, the more responsive
housing supply is to changes in housing demand. A high ratio, appearing to represent a high
rate of return, in this context reflects a distorted housing market where supply is so restricted
that the scarcity of housing results in inflated housing prices. If the Bank were to introduce
regulatory reform projects in other countries, new methods of evaluation should be
developed.
44. A third lesson is that the type borrower control over a project represented here can
make it more difficult for the Bank to exercise direct leverage over a project. In this project,
Korea exercised significant control over designing, funding, and carrying out the studies.
The government's commitment to the project's objectives certainly contributed to the
immediate and dramatic impact on housing policy and regulation. But at the same time, with
policy conditionality linked only to the broad directions outlined in the PDS and with the
Korean government funding its own studies, the Bank had little leverage to insure that the
project would proceed according to design. As it happened, project experience diverged only
slightly from project design because the Bank and the government worked well together to
keep the project on track. In another country or sector, though, this lack of leverage might
have posed a significant risk if the project implementation diverged considerably from project
design. On balance, borrower ownership in a project is desirable, but this project's
experience suggests that if borrower ownership means less leverage for the Bank, the Bank






Table 1: Summary of Assessments








Other social objectives X
Environmental objectives X
Public sector management X















Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory






Table 2: Related Bank Loans
Loan title Purpose Year of Status
approval
National Urban Land Supported the establishment of the Korea Land Development 1981 completed
Development Project Corporation and promoted, through the Korea National
Ln. 1980-KO Housing Corporation, the provision of several types of
housing units affordable to low-income households
Second National Urban Land Further strengthened the Korea Land Development 1982 completed
Development and Housing Corporation and the Korea National Housing Corporation,
Project improved their coordination, set social objectives and began
Ln. 2216-KO to address housing finance issues
Urban Land Development Supported a comprehensive program of institutional and 1986 completed
Project policy development for the Korea Land Development
Ln. 2704-KO Corporation and assisted the development and provision of
infrastructure and services to house about one million people
Housing Finance Sector Supported a two-year time slice of the National Housing 1987 completed
Project Fund's lending program for low-income households and
Ln. 2853-KO addressed a number of policy and institutional issues related






Table 3: Project Timetable








Project completion Jun-95 Dec-93






Table 4: Loan Disbursements (Cumulative)
(US$ million equivalent)
Jun-91 Dec-91 Jun-92 Dec-92 Jun-93 Dec-93 Jun-94 Dec-94 Jun-95
Appraisal estimate 0.0 2.0 8.0 24.0 44.0 63.0 82.0 95.0 100.0
Actual 0.0 7.0 20.6 48.6 83.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Actual as % of estimate 1 350% 1 258% 203% 190% 159% 122% 105% 100%
Disbursements (Estimated vs. Actual)
120.0
> 80.0- - ;u
1 60.0 . .. .
E .o- . ......
20.0- : 






Table 5: Key Indicators for Proiect Implementation
Ratio of average house
price to average Ratio of average rent
Year GNP growth rate income to average income
1990 9.2% 8.08 0.21
1991 8.4% 9.38 n.a.
1992 4.8% 7.15 n.a.
1993 5.6% 5.96 0.29
1994 8.0% 4.97 n.a.
Ratio of prices of Fraction of NHF
residentially zoned and Ratio of market price borrowers below
adjacent raw land of housing to input national median
Year costs income level
1990 3.40 54%
1991 4.01 2.2 48%
1992 3.29 2.1 57%
1993 3.33 1.3 54%






Table 6a: Proiect Costs
(US$ million equivalent)
p raisal estimate | Actual
Foreign Foreign
Item Local costs costs Total Local costs costs Total
IBRD-supported units in NHF
housing program 399.5 100.0 499.5 399.5 100.0 499.5
TA/studies 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5
TOTAL 400.0 100.0 500.0 400.0 100.0 500.0
Table 6b: Project Financin2
(US$ million equivalent)
Apraisal estimate Actual |
Foreign Foreign
Local costs costs Total Local costs costs Total
Government 400.0 0.0 400.0 400.0 0.0 400.0
World Bank 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0






Table 7: Status of Leeal Covenants
Section Covenant Description Status Comment
Loan
2.02 Borrower shall open special account C Complied.
3.04 Borrower shall annually review progress in implementation of
the Policy Development Statement
C Complied
3.05 Borrower shall fumish for the Bank, for review and
comments, results of studies to be carried out under the policy
development component of the project
C Complied
4.01(bXii) Borrower shall furnish the audit to the Bank not later than
nine months after the end of each fiscal year Compliance was generally late. FY93
CD audit overdue since 9/30/94
4.0l(cXiv) The Borrower shall ensure a separate opinion of SoE Compliance was generally late. FY93
_withdrawals CD audit overdue since 9/30/95
Key
C: complied






Table 8: Bank Resources











DATE: December 16, 1994
TO: Mr. Vineet Nayyar Chief, EAlIN
FROM: Lawrence M. Hannah, Principal Economist, TWURD)
EXTENSION: 33623
SUBJECT: KOREA: Housing Project (Loan 3329-KO)
SuDervision Mission of November 1994. Back-to-Office Remort
1. According to Terms of Reference dated October 13, 1993, I visited Korea from
November 2-5, 1993 to supervise the above-mentioned project. The project was approved by the
Board on July 19, 1991 and was declared effective on October 16, 1991. The loan is fully
disbursed.
2. The following documents are attached:
(a) Supervision Form 590 (Annex 1);
(b) List of persons met by the mission (Annex 2);
(c) List of related documents (Annex 3);
(d) Draft letter addressed to Mr. Kang Ghil-Booh, Director General, Housing
Bureau, Ministry of Construction (Annex 4).
3. The project includes two main components: (a) funding (US$ 100 million) for an
ongoing program of targeted lending through The National Housing Fund (NHF) for low-income
housing and (b) technical assistance for institution building and policy reform in the sector. All
aspects of the project were discussed with MOC but the emphasis of this supervision was to
review the policy development component of the project.
The Policy Development ComDonent of the Housing Project
4. Although the IBRD-supported Housing Project (Loan no. 3329-KO) was an investment
operation, the broader objective was to contribute to the process of policy-naking and
institutional strengthening in the housing sector. Four areas for assessment of policy and
preparation of reform plans were agreed at the outset of the project: housing indicators,
government housing programs, regulations in the sector and the land supply system.
5. Specific exercises were set at the time of negotiations and several subsequent
modifications were agreed between the Government and the Bank as implementation proceeded.
Those changes are noted below under the discussion of the individual topics. The strategy for
this project has been to explore and to exploit every opportunity and communication channel to
get questions on key sector issues on the policy agenda. Thus, this report also notes the broader
range of housing policy developments during the project period and links them to the activities
undertaken in conjunction with the project, where possible.
6. Indicators: As a basic diagnostic exercise, and to establish a monitoring and performance
evaluation capability for the housing sector, a housing indicators study was to be undertaken.
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The study was completed and the results are reported in the Part I of "An Assessment of Korea
Housing Policy and Future Policy Directions (An English Summary), Ministry of Construction,
January 1994". The exercise used secondary and newly collected data on 43 indicators including
many of the same variables contained in the Bank--ABITAT housing indicators project. The
international benchmark data collected by the Bank-HABITAT project were available to the
Koreans and were used to establish relative measures of performance of the Korean housing
sector. The Korean indicators work was also the basis of a critique of the specification of some
of the existing housing sector goals and targets in Korea. Another result of the indicators
exercise undertaken by the Koreans was thus the adoption by the National Statistics Office of a
different definition of a housing unit which paints a more accurate picture of the conditions in the
housing sector in Korea. In turn, this modification has taken some of the pressure off the
traditional physical output targets long favored by policy-makers. The studies were also partially
responsible for the now comnmon reference to the price-to-income ratio (PIR) as the basic measure
of housing sector performance. The PIR is prominently reflected in the latest revision of the
Seventh Five Year Plan (Annex 3:Item 1) and the Minister of Construction during project
implementation period often referred to PIR as a measure of the distortions in the Korean housing
market. Additionally, the shift to economic measures of how well (poorly) the land market was
fuLctioning also played a role in the recent reforms in that area as discussed below.
7. The final objective for housing indicators, to make their collection and analysis a regular
part of the work of the Housing Bureau of MOC has not occurred. The reasons seem related to
the lack of staff and budget for such a regular exercise and perhaps the inmnediate nature of the
problems faced by all levels of bureaucrats in the present political atmosphere. KRIHS staff
continues to lobby for this rype of approach to monitoring sector performance. The preparation
of the national report for HABITAT II (Istanbul 1996), which is starting now, and which. relies
on an indicators exercise, will be a major opportunity to make this approach a regula.Aelement
in monitoring and developing policy in the sector. KRIHS will be working on this reporrfor the
Housing Bureau of MOC.
8. Review of Government Housins Proerams (GHP): The objective of this component was
to assess GHPs in terms of their effectiveness in achieving their goals and in terms of the
rationality across GHPs. The results of the study of 13 GHPs are reported in Part II of "An
Assessment of Korea Housing Policy and Futu.e Policy Directions (An English Summary),
Ministry of Construction, January 1994." (Annex 3:Item 2) The methodology employed follows
the cost-benefit analysis suggested in the terms of reference agreed at negotiations. The findings
highlight the inequity and inefficiency of a number of programs. The recommendations for
reform emphasized four strategies for GHPs: increase the supply of new units, establish minimum
dwelling standards, better direct subsidies to low-income households and rationalize public
programs supporting housing sector development. The details of these suggestions are contained
in two document, one from KRIHS and one from MOC. (Annex 3:Items 3 and 4) The
recommendations on land supply are an input to the reforms already enacted and discussed below.
Those related to rationalization of the subsidies implied in major public programs such as NHF
are the content of the 1995 program now available in draft form.
9. Rezulatorv Reform Proeram (RRP): The RRP exercise was closely related to the GHP
analysis where, in fact, the original terms of reference in the Staff Appraisal Report was
combined as a single annex (number 6a). The proposed methodology also relied on a cost-benefit
view of specific regulations which were considered to be the same as program features in terms
of creating costs and benefits for various actors in the housing market. Part II of "An
Assessment of Korea Housin, Policy and Future Policy Directions (An English Summary),
Ministry of Construction, January 1994" covers some regulatory matters but the real story of
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regulatory reform shifted to the Office of the President when Mr. Kim Y.S. was inaugurated in
February 1993.
10. President Kim committed himself to a bt-5a strategy of regulatory reform designed to
remove or reduce excess or inappropriate regulation on all aspects of the economy including
housing. Institutionally, he established the Public Administration Innovation Committee (PAIC)
on April 9, 1993 which is a standing blue-ribbon conmnittee charged with receiving, raising and
recommending reforms on government regulation. The main committee is comprised of 15
members most of whom are prominent academics, civil servants, representatives of the
community and businessmen. There are twenty members of the technical working groups. On
housing, KRIHS has the technical responsibility.
11. In addition to the technical work of the Commnittee, the PAIC served to attract the
comments and concems from citizens, interest groups (NGOs) and the research and academic
communities. The agenda, thus established, was much broader, though probably more short-term
than might have otherwise been considered. Institutions such as KRIHS took this opportunity to
present well-researched suggestions to: reform rental housing regulations, relax land use
controls, expand housing finance and address the needs of low-income households more directly
(see Planning Information Bulletin of KRIHS, monthly where August 1994 discusses the reforms
already made and the forthcoming November 1994 issue provides implementation details).
12. According to the written records of the PAIC, 1,235 issues related to MOC were raised
of which 451 were selected for review. Of those 112 were related to housing and 78 specific
reforms have already implemented and 34 are pending (Annex 3:Item 5). Although many of the
regulatory changes to date appear to be mninor, the PAIC has set the tone for exaniuing and
reformning government interventions in the sector. The most critical issue, decontrol of prices
on new apartments, was considered, a recommendation by PAIC was made, but the 'lected
policy-makers declined to act on this most sensitive of sector policy issues at this time. In recent
years this issue has been so intractable as to result in mninisterial resignation just for raising the
issue. The debate resulting from the PAIC is a significant step forward.
13. Although the PAIC was not a result of this project, the work and inputs by KRIHS were
based on their own research products and experience including exercises undertaken for this
IBRD-supported project.
14. Reform of the Land SupplV Svstem: Although originally included in the project
exercises, the Bank subsequently agreed to a substitution in the terms of reference where a study
on housing demand was undertaken by KRIHS at the request of MOC rather than the land
exercise. This decision seemed justified at the time, in part, because other work on urban land
issues was being undertaken and the results of that work are reported here. It is worth noting
that all of the policy development exercises were wholly financed by the Government of Korea
as was the work on the land supply system but that the approach, methodologies and results are
all directly related to the dialogue on policy between the Bank and the Government during
preparation and implementation of this project.
15. Korea has had a very complicated and restrictive policy of land-use controls. Many
analysts believe this is a major factor in the high price of urban land and therefore housing. The
principal impediment o past attempts to reform the system was the opposition of various groups
to the conversion of non-urban land to residential and commnercial/industrial uses. The
Government's strategy was to emphasize a near monopoly position for public land developers
(KLDC, KNHC and local governments), in part, to capture the enormous gains when land
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conversion took place. KRIHS researchers completed a major study on land policy toward the
end of 1992 (Annex 3:Item 6) and the publication of the results coincided with the installation
of the new administration. To the surprise of many the push for reform had succeeded.
16. The process of revision led to a newly enacted "National Land-use Management Law in
August of 1993." The related implementation ordinances and regulations were revised in
December 1993 and implementation commenced in early 1994. The essence of the change was
to reduce ten categories of land in Korean law to five and to permit, on an almost automatic basis
the use of semi-agricultural and (which comprises 27.2 % of the national land mass), for housing
and other urban uses. The process adopted grants a land-use change in combination with the
issuance of a building permit and limits the opportunity for intervention by other interests such
as agriculture. It also vests significant authority in the hands of local authorities.
17. Initial experience with the revised law raised concerns about the supply of infrastructure
and services in the areas where private companies want to develop land and build housing. The
most acute issue is water and transportation infrastructure and regulations were added to limit
development permission in areas where these services were either inadequate on not part of the
developers plan to supply. In addition, the response was to limit densities to FAR 150 % and
maximum height of 15 stories which are about one-half of that permitted in existing urban zoned
land areas. New regulations were issued in June 1994.
18. More significantly the Government also prepared and enacted a law permitting and
encouraging private participation in the provision of infrastructure. The bill became law in July
1994 and is named the 'Promotion Act for Private Investment in Social Overhead Capital (the
usual Korean phrase for infrastructure) July 1994." This law opens up the supply of
infrastructure to private firms and compensates them for such provision with more generous
development permissions. A study on impact fees is planned for next year to' compliment this
law. Another new law called "Regional Balanced Development Act" of August 1993 also
increased the opportunities for private participation in land development.
19. Overall the process of reform is moving, at least in part due to the exercises implemented
under this project.
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A PiRFOPMANCE REPORT ON IBRD SUPPORT OF
HOUSING PROJECT(3320K0)
I. Evalution Of Housing Policies In Kore
1. The First Stage(1945-1961)
o Social welfare aspects of housing were mpsed rather than a
systematic housing policy.
o Rapid population increase, after being liberated from the Japanes and
the massive destruction of housing units during the Korean War,
meant that there ested severe sotage of housing. Efforts to
overcome this situation wsv to mainly build temporary housing units,
aided by UNKRA, however, with little result.
2. The Second Stage(1962-1971)
o Housing sector was included in the Five-Year economic Developnmt
Plan considerig econozic effects of housing construction an the related
Idustres.
- lowever, the volume of housing investment ws relatively small due
to mor emphasis on the sconmic growth and the expansion of
industrial capacity.
o The efforts of the government, during this period, wero concentrated on
restructing of housing related institutions and laws.
- Restructuring of the Korea National Land Bureau to the Ministry of
Construction
* Establishment of the Korea National Housing Corporation in 1962
- Revision or legilation of housing related acts, such as Public Housing
Act, Land Expropriation Act, Building Code, and Urban Planning Act
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8. The Third Stage(1972-1977)
o The success of the First and the Second Five-Year Economic
Development Plan reulted in rapid urbanization. However, this, with
the Increase in the formation of nuclear families meant svere housimg
shortage, especially in the urban area, which became a social problem
o The government was actively involved in solving the housing shortage
problem through;
Enactment of the Housng Construction Promotion Act
Preperation of housing supply plan with the National Housing FIund
(NHF) and loans from abroad.
4. The Fourth Stage(1978-1987)
o Real estate speculation in the late 1970s pushed up the housing price.
* Consequently, the stabilization of housing price as well as the
expansion in hosing supply became the major policy goal.
- Also, in order to relieve housing problem for the poor, more emphasi
was placed on the low-income households.
To mobilize the housing construction fud, fovernment took on loan
from [BRD of an amount of 321,540 thousand USD(KLDC 63,520,
KNHC 37,980, NHF 219,870 USD) during the period from 1981 to
198.
o Regulations on the housing price control and on the land transaction
were reinforced which had been introduced in the late 1970.. On the
other hand, legislation of the Rental Housing Construction Promotion
Act encouraged the rental housng industry.
II. The Evaluation Of IBRD Performance On The Project
1. Policy Direction Recom=edated By the IBRD
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o IBRD's approach to the housing problem is based on the following:
- Main policy goal is to stabilize the housing for the people and to
promote their welfare. This means that policy benefits must go to
the low income class through the construction of smalT sized units.
* Therfore, housing is a sc2al good as well as an economic commodity
that must be solved in thi competitive housing market.
o Th role of the government, suggested by IBRD, is to stabilize people's
housing. This contributed much to the securing of accomodation for
the low-income houholds.
2. Project Monitoring
o Net revnue of NHF has beon increased during the project period of
1991 to 1993.
o Thus, by inducing increase In loan amouxt and decrease in loan
inUtrest rate, more bendts were given to the non-owner of housing
units.
O Therefore, IBRD contzibuted heavily to promote the public role of NHF.
m. Accomplishment Of Housing Construotion(1901-93) and the
Performane Of IBD' Fourth Project
1. Evaluation of Korean Housing Policy in the Late 1980s and the
Imposition of a New Policy
o Evaluation
Intervention of the governmont in the housing market, throgh the
regulations on the housing price and housing supply, seemed to deter
the speculation temporarily. However, in the long run, It curtailed the
housing constuction, which reulted m the housing pnce to inrease.
The izflation of the housing price outstriped the rise in Income, which
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expanded equallty in welfare between owners and non-owners of
housing units. The housing problem became an important social
dilemma.
o Formulation of the Two Million Housing Construction Plan
- The government set up a Two Million Housing Constmction Plan and
fnally constructed 2,720 thousand units.
- The now government, which came to power in 1998, set up a New
Five-Year Development Economic Plan which includes a plan to
construct 2,850 thousand unita(500d600 thousand units per year)
during the period from 1998 to 1997. Housing supply ratio is
expected to be increased up to 90% by 1997.
2. Goals of the Fourth IBRD Project and Its Performance
o Goals
The maiL goal Is to give support to non-owners to acquire their own
houses.
Fifton thousand housing units were constucted with the aid of
J.BRD loans.
I -BRD loans contributed 40% of the loan amount of 12,000 thousand
won per household.
- An additional goal is to develop a systmatic and comprehensive
housing policy through research projects.
O Peformance
- The fourth IBRD loan of 100 million USD(78,685 milion won) has
contributed much towardc achieving the Two Million Housing
Construction Plan(1988-92) and the 2.85 Million Units of Housing
Construction Plan, included in the New Five-Year Economic
Developmnt Plan (1998-97).
. Increase In the Housing Supply Ratio
Year 70 80 87 88 89 90 91 92 98
Ratio 7 8.2 71l. 2 63. 2 69 .4 - 70. 9 172.4 _7_4 .5 _78.0 7.11
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MaintemaLce of a Downtrend in Housing Prices
Year 930 _91 1 92 1 9
Inrasing Rate 21.0Ya 10-.5;9 .. 06 .2.946
In order to promote housing welfare for low-income houholdand
non-owners, all units constructed by the public sector wer szol11l
sized one.
IBRD loan supported researh project such as "A. Study On the
Evaluation of Housing Policy and the Future Policy Direction', and
it also supported the training program to foster experts in housing
policy aud its effective implentation.
Nine poms wen benefited fo the traUng program fom 1091
to 1908 (three persons per yeo).
o Yearly accomplishment of housing consucdon and NIF support
- Achievement for the year 1991:
* Two Million Houding Constrction Plan has been accomplished one
year earlier than planned by consurctn its of housing(thousand
units by the public sector), icludiw permanent rental housing for
the urban poor, worker' housing, small-sized bousing units for sale,
and housing units constructed by implemtation of the 5lve new
town development in the capital region.
. NHF aided by IEBRD, with the loan of 7 million USD (5,258 mI1an
won), has contributed much to stabilise the housing of non-mwers.
NHP supported 2,508.6 billion won to the construction of 18.6
thousand units including the construction of housig units in the
Residential Environment Improvement District, and to the
costructor's acquisition of prefabricated housing matiL or
equipment.
- Achievement for the year 1992:
TIotal of 675 thousand units wer constructed (195 thousand uits
by the public sector) including public ntal housing for the low.
income cla, housings for workers, small-sized units for sale, md
the housing units constructed by continuous implementtion of the
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five now ton development in the capital rtion.
NHF aided by IDED, with the loan of 41.54 mllion USD (82,447
milllon won), started to support the public housing constbuctl
NHF supported 8,058.9 billion won to constut 143 thousand un
with the increase of the loan amount to alleviate consuznes burden
Achievement for tho year 1998:
. Total of 695 thousand units wer constru (227 thousad untt
by the public sector), indudini public rental hsing, works'.
housing, mall-sixed units for sale, and the housing units
construcd by the Implezntation the fthe ew town developent
in the capital region.
. NIF, aided by of 81.88 million USD (40,935 millio Won), financed
2,90.1 billion won to construct 222 husand units. In ardor to
alleviate the burden of the consumers, loan amount was on the
1neae, }wher as the interest of the loan was on the dsreas.
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